Spitting in the Soup, continued from above
Spanish scholar Bernat López researched how EPO was transformed from a life-saving miracle hormone into what he calls a "drug of mass destruction."21 Although no evidence exists to support the claim that EPO caused any of the cyclists' deaths in the early 1990s, López's research led him to conclude that the rumor had ossified into received wisdom through media repetition. The fiction served as propaganda that made it professionally and personally suicidal to challenge the morality and righteousness of the antidrug movement.
As López sees it, the story of EPO killing loads of cyclists became a "flagship myth" for anti-doping interests. It was a story manufactured and spread by the press with the intent of scaring athletes. López, a professor at the Universitat Rovira i Virgili in Catalonia, also argues that because the general public is largely indifferent to the drug-regulating policies that are the bedrock of anti-doping organizations, anti-doping missionaries played up the deadly EPO myth as a way to gain sympathy from a public that has an otherwise insatiable appetite for legal and illeÂgal performance- and lifestyle-enhancing drugs.
When López ran a meta-analysis of 36 academic texts that referenced the EPO deaths as evidence of the danger of EPO, he discovered a scholÂarly train wreck. All the articles either referred to no source for their EPO-deaths claims or noted secondary resources that cited no source. As a result of this evidence-free conclusion making, academics came up with a shambolic number of EPO deaths, ranging from 5 to 20. The victims' nationalities were also wildly inconsistent. While newspapers like the New York Times reported that the dead riders were Dutch, the academic researchers indicated that they hailed from Spain, Holland, Belgium, and Scandinavia. The deaths also took place during variable time frames ranging from "the 1980s and early 1990s" to "between 1997 and 2000," to "1987 to 1991."
López also looked at 20 academic texts that offered evidence against the claim that EPO killed a bunch of cyclists in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The articles commonly pointed to genetic heart defects as the most likely cause of the deaths. None of these studies cited EPO as a potential or actual cause. If the researchers behind the 20 papers came up with any one Grim Reaper haunting bike races and marathons around the world, it was the damaging effect of extreme and prolonged training. In sum, López concluded, the 20 studies he investigated "sugÂgest that EPO is extremely unlikely to have had the effects that have been claimed in the speculation of anti-doping sports doctors, academÂics, and journalists."
When López performed the same analysis of coverage in the popuÂlar press, he found an even bigger mess of chronology and nationality. News reports put the number of EPO "victims" anywhere from 7 to 40, from countries including Spain, Holland, Belgium, Germany, and Poland as well as generic "Europe." Moreover, the articles cited athletes dying from EPO beginning in 1970, even though EPO was not produced for clinical trials until 1986.
When López broadened the scope of his search to include newspaÂpers, magazines, blogs, and cycling websites for mentions of sudden deaths among cyclists between 1987 and early 2010, he found 49 cyclist sudden-death stories. In the time frame most often mentioned as ground zero for EPO deaths, 1987 to 1992, López unearthed news reports of 17 sudden deaths in Belgium, Holland, France, and the UK. These numbers are in line with the expected number of deaths from naturally occurring heart failures in athletes and the general population.
According to López's research from 1995 to 2006, 180 athlete sudÂden deaths were reported in Spain alone-about 15 per year. Of that total, 39 deaths were cyclists and 40 were soccer players. In other words, whether the number of cyclist deaths in Europe in the early 1990s was 15, 17, 18, or 20, those numbers do not reflect a spike, but rather a death rate entirely consistent with normal athlete sudden-death statistics in a single European country and low for all of Europe combined.
Compared to sudden cardiac deaths in both the athletic and larger population, the "explosion" of cyclist deaths that supposedly came at the hand of EPO does not seem like an anomaly; that number of deaths is normal. The anomaly was the arrival of a new, highly effective doping product. Blinded by a rising anti-doping fervor, journalists and medical researchers alike seemed to have superimposed EPO onto normal death rates and created a crisis where there was little, if any, postmortem eviÂdence to suggest a correlation between EPO and fatalities. Yet the ghosts of the mythical 18 cyclists still haunt us today. As recently as 2012, an academic review of scientific studies on the effectiveness and safety of erythropoietin mentions the possible link between EPO and "18 EuroÂpean professional cyclists [who] have died."
The narrative about crime, death, and drugs was believable because-three years after the 1988 approval of EPO use in Europe-the story sounded logical. Athletes eager to win plus a potentially dangerous new drug equaled death. When I called López at his home south of BarceÂlona, he told me he has yet to find a scrap of hard evidence linking EPO with any cyclist's death in the early 1990s. With the weary sigh of a man who had discovered a truth no one wanted to hear, he told me, "Science has not produced so far-at least to my knowledge-any conclusive evidence linking EPO with sudden death." While dozens of papers conÂtinue to speculate about a link between EPO and the rash of Belgian and Dutch deaths, "they are just reproducing the myth," López explained.
As López sees it, the role of the EPO deaths in the war on drugs in sport is analogous to the role fictional weapons of mass destruction played in the justification of the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003. "There was a war to be waged, and the people waging that war needed justification, an excuse, a solid reason," he observed. Turning back to the EPO fiction, he said, "The best reason for waging that war is that doping kills. 'We honest men, we must stop athletes from taking drugs because we are interested in saving their lives.'" By exaggerating and distorting the EPO story, the anti-doping establishment was able to preÂdict a dire future. And a bleak tomorrow creates incentives for stronger, better-funded anti-doping measures while also spinning far more comÂpelling media narratives.
In 1906, Olympic founder Pierre de Coubertin described the OlymÂpic Games as a "program of moral purification."26 This mission carries on today as an anti-doping errand in a chemically polluted sporting wilÂderness. For López, there is a link between the foundation of Olympic sports as a morally purifying, soul-cleansing experience and Olympic sports' ongoing efforts to preserve what the WADA code formally labels the "spirit of sport." "Well, actually," López clarified for me, "they are interested in saving their souls, but they pretended that they were interÂested in saving their lives."
My own search of medical literature finds plenty of warnings about the dangers of too much EPO. And there are many examples of pharmaÂceutical companies paying physicians kickbacks to overdose patients, a process that inadvertently accelerates the growth of deadly tumors. However, I found no documented instances of EPO killing already healthy humans, athletes or otherwise.
In December 2006, Danish researchers reported that 10 percent of a clinical trial group of 516 head and neck cancer patients on heavy EPO doses experienced accelerating tumor growth, even while undergoing radiation treatment.27 This confirmed studies going back to 2003, which also showed that EPO could boost cancer growth. And 10 years earlier, a 1996 study of dialysis patients was halted because patients on high EPO dosages suffered more heart attacks than a control group on lower amounts of EPO.
The deaths were not related to something that was inherently destructive about EPO. Instead, they were caused by overdosing. In 2007, Johnson & Johnson's annual EPO sales were $3.5 billion, while Amgen moved $5.6 billion worth of the product. To attain these astronomical numbers, Amgen and Johnson & Johnson built incentive programs that financially rewarded doctors who administered heavy "off-label" doses of EPO to cancer and anemia patients. One West Coast office of six oncologists pocketed $2.7 million in incentives from Amgen in 2006 alone. The nationwide priming of the EPO pump led to a well-documented rash of heart attacks and carcinoma deaths in cancer and renal failure patients-so many that in 2007, the FDA released a report suggesting the dollar-incentivized high doses were neither improving nor extending patient lives.
That said,
even massive amounts of EPO don't automatically lead to death. A 2006 paper described two hospitalized South Korean heart-attack patients who accidentally received nearly 10 times their prescribed dose of EPO-318,000 units instead of 33,000. Both patients were smokers, and one had a history of hypertension and diabetes. After discovering the overdose, the hospital closely monitored the patients for symptoms such as elevated blood pressure, nausea, vomiting, shock, and thromboÂsis (which had already put them in the hospital). Despite the overdose, doctors reported that the two patients experienced none of the negative expected side effects from toxic levels of EPO. While known reactions to EPO overdoses make for a long, serious list-headache, muscle and joint pain, allergic reactions, nausea, itching, seizures, enlarged spleen, elevated blood pressure, and overproduction of blood platelets-the docÂtors reported that "in the course of close observation, we found none of the specific symptoms we expected as side effects of erythropoietin, and no abnormal objective findings on physical examination." The patients were soon discharged, and their EPO levels returned to normal.
In 1993, a wheezing, clammy-skinned man showed up at a New York emergency room complaining of shortness of breath and a cough. The frail 62-year-old repeatedly told the doctors that he needed a "transfuÂsion to correct anemia" and that he was stricken by "chronically low hematocrit." The ER doctors had a delusional hypochondriac on their hands with a history of self-medicating. The victim, a retired biomediÂcal engineer, had a friend in the pharmaceutical industry who supplied him with Epogen. The arrivee had been injecting himself with EPO every day for several months (EPO is typically administered three times a week). He was also taking daily doses of a stew of other medicines, including penicillin.
When the patient checked into the ER, his hematocrit level was a through-the-roof 70.4 percent, a number that startled doctors used to finding a typical 42 to 54 percent hematocrit in adult males. While the fact that the patient was taking so many other drugs made it difficult to tie his symptoms to EPO alone, a report on the case in the American Journal of Emergency Medicine indicated that the months-long overdosÂing on EPO was causing the patient chest pain and hypertension, and it had worsened symptoms of his existing lung disease. The report pointed out that when a hematocrit level exceeds 70 percent, the amount of oxyÂgen reaching the brain decreases, which in itself can be dangerous. In spite of his spectacular abuse of EPO, the patient recovered and was later released to a psychiatric hospital.
These vignettes are not meant to argue that EPO abuse is safe. It's not. In their write-up of the case, the physicians took the opportunity to warn other doctors to be on the lookout for athletes who self-administer EPO: "It seems likely that an erythropoietin-induced increase in hematocrit, coupled with the dehydration that develops during prolonged exertion, would increase blood viscosity and cause impaired muscle perfusion and possible fatal thrombosis." The point remains, however, that it is extremely difficult to find a case that backs up the press-supported notion that EPO was indiscriminately slaughtering cyclists in the early 1990s.
One reason European athletes may have quickly adopted EPO in Europe in the late 1980s is related to a difference in European and American patent law. Shortly after Amgen successfully cloned EPO in 1982, at least four other biotech firms and the University of Washington separately made the same breakthrough. A court battle handed the U.S. patent to Amgen. European patent law, however, is reluctant to grant patents on naturally occurring substances, and Amgen did not get an EPO monopoly on the other side of the Atlantic. As a result, Europeans had access to EPO from at least three manufacturers.
This pharmaceutical company competition, along with the buyÂing power of Europe's national health care systems, kept EPO prices much lower in Europe. The affordability put the drug within financial reach of struggling European athletes while the drug's distribution from multiple chemical manufacturers may have created more opportunities for gray market product leakage. According to Alessandro Donati, an Italian sports professor and doping investigator, data from the sales of performance-enhancing drugs in Italy show that of 181 million prescripÂtions studied in 2000, the best-selling ones were erythropoietin and human growth hormone. The €158 million worth of EPO sold in Italy in 2000 did not include amounts brought in from Switzerland, nor the EPO distributed by the Mafia-much of it stolen from pharmacies or obtained from illicit distributors. Donati also cites a 1999 French study that indiÂcated that only one-sixth of global EPO production went to patients with pathologies, with the rest being distributed through underground marÂkets. Because there were more manufacturers of EPO in Europe than in the United States, Europe had more distribution nodes from which the drug could be bought or stolen, he says.
Interestingly, health care system differences ended up saving the lives of cancer victims in Europe compared to the United States. In 2001, Amgen released a new EPO called Aranesp. To spur product sales, the company offered $1,200 kickbacks to doctors for every prescription written. Amgen also ran a TV ad blitz that encouraged patients to ask for Aranesp as an antidote to fatigue. Prescriptions skyrocketed 340 percent in the United States, but increased only 52 percent in Europe. Across the pond, direct-to-consumer marketing is illegal, national health care systems use their buying clout to negotiate lower drug costs, and doctors in those same health care systems are immune to Big Pharma payola.
Five years after the Aranesp release, studies began to indicate that American cancer patients were dying 10 percent more frequently than European cancer sufferers. As it turned out, EPO was accelerating tumor growth; the American sales-and-marketing incentives that got more patients to take more EPO had the unintended effect of killing them off more quickly than in Europe, where patients were shielded from the pharmaceutical company's aggressive sales-and-marketing efforts. While there is no evidence directly linking EPO to any competitive cyclist deaths in Europe, in the United States, there are ample data showing that heavy EPO use incentivized by the oddities of the American health care system was shortening cancer patient lives. This discovery lead to a sterner FDA-mandated "black box" warning on EPO packaging and a decline in American oncologists' enthusiastic EPO prescription writÂing.36 The scandal also suggests how EPO's black reputation in sports as a drug of mass destruction got an assist from drug makers' efforts to expand product sales.
During a conversation with López over Skype, I mentioned Michele Ferrari's infamous statement about EPO and orange juice. López said that Ferrari had dared to tell a truth that violated an anti-doping article of faith, one that firmly established itself after the IOC took its more aggressive anti-doping stance in the wake of the 1984 Los Angeles blood-doping episode: If it's a performance-enhancing drug, it must be categorically destructive to health and the spirit of sport. In the severe catechism of anti-doping thought that was hardening after Los Angeles and the 1988 Ben Johnson scandal in Seoul, there was no room for a fact-based argument like Ferrari's. Performance-enhancing drugs must be evil-end of story. For challenging the anti-doping missionaries' creed by suggesting that the abuse of drugs is harmful, not drugs in and of themselves, Ferrari was immediately exiled.
"You cannot say Ferrari," López observed. For his orange-juice comÂment, "he has been condemned. He is in hell and you cannot rehabilitate Ferrari's image or respectability because received wisdom says that FerÂrari is the devil."
López was not justifying Ferrari's acts. The Italian doctor repeatedly broke the laws of the land and sports, and he conspired to give certain athletes an illegal performance advantage that others did not share. He was banned for life by the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency for his involvement with Lance Armstrong's doping and for administering and trafficking in performance-enhancing drugs. Even in 1994, he was up to no good. However, what interests López is how journalists who write about doping, and the agencies that create and enforce doping codes, can condemn Ferrari for speaking a truth about EPO when they have used the EPO-kills fabrication as a justification for a steadily growing anti-doping infrastructure.
López is not optimistic that journalists or anti-doping agencies will hold themselves accountable about the true health risks of doping any time soon. Doing so would be to spit in the soup that feeds them. It would also suggest that our responses to drugs are based more on perÂsonal bias than on hard data. "People are not interested in listening to other versions" of this colorful, body-strewn doping history, López told me. Excising the "doping kills" fable does no good for the anti-doping evangelists' cause because the falsehood has self-justifying utility. As López put it, the EPO-kills story is useful as an anti-doping foundation myth. Like Knud Enemark Jensen's "death by amphetamines," the tale is factually ignorant but practically useful for the media and anti-doping bureaucracy's "general condemnation and refusal of doping."
As for the inherent ethical contradiction in the twisting of truth by anti-doping activists in order to return athletes to "true sport," López does not think sinister motives are at play. Anti-doping agencies, sciÂentists, and journalists are reluctant to discuss the fictional nature of drug-death stories because these tales serve a moral good that is a descenÂdent of Coubertin's quest for purity. The EPO-kills story "was useful for the anti-doping campaign," López explained. "So it didn't matter if the evidence was good enough or not because it was conducive" to the anti-doping missionaries' goal of imposing a new purity on sports. In fact, López feels that anti-doping campaigners are acting in good faith, rather than willful hypocrisy. "I don't think that they lied on purpose," López told me. "But what they did was create a truth out of circumstantial and scattered evidence. And they believed in their own creation."
Source:
https://www.roadbikereview.com/threa...e-soup.380936/